A Complex Alliance: The Relationship Between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey.

Written as an independent study for my master’s class. This paper was designed to examine why Turkey provides economic and military support to neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan, the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) but not their goals for independence. The answer to this question is the subject of this paper. I drove into the complex history of the region going back a hundred years to the creation of modern Turkey and its national identity and to further examine the various reasons for how this strained but mutually beneficial relationship started, how the issue of independence and identity is currently being handled by all parties involved (Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq) and its impact on both countries and the region. 

Written 10th of May, 2021

In the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, the lands under its former control were carved up by colonial powers, principally the British and French giving rise to tensions both ethnic and religious that have persisted to this day. The British had previously promised various Arab tribes and minorities such as the Kurds that if they revolted against the Ottomans, they would be allowed to become their own independent countries.  However, the British subsequently reneged on those promises because they realized it would be in their best interest for them to determine territorial boundaries in the Middle East. No group felt the consequences of these broken promises more acutely than the people living in the mountainous region between the countries of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, the people known as the Kurds. To this day Kurds are the subject of discrimination and violence by the countries they live in. However, over the past 30 years the Kurdish people through luck and determination have been able to carve out a piece of their long-held dream of an independent country. Iraqi Kurdistan, a semi-autonomous region in Northern Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan, which is known as the “other Iraq” because of its relative peace and prosperity, is an example of a fully functioning Democracy in the Middle East. It is surprising however that much of the help in establishing this secular, inclusive Middle Eastern democracy is one of the Kurdish people’s oldest enemies, the Turks of Turkey. Following World War I, the borders of modern-day Turkey were re-drawn to include territory which was inhabited by ethnic Kurds for thousands of years. Today over 15 million Kurds live in Eastern Turkey and although they are formally considered to be Turkish citizens by the Turkish government, there have been long-standing tensions between Turks and these ethnic Kurds.  Yet despite tensions, Turkey provides economic and military support to neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan, the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) but not their goals for independence. Why does Turkey support the aspirations of Turkish and Iraqi Kurds differently? The answer to this question is the subject of this paper. That answer lies within the context of the history of the region going back a hundred years to the creation of modern Turkey and its national identity. This requires an examination of various reasons for how this strained but mutually beneficial relationship started, how the issue of independence is currently being handled by all parties involved (Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq) and its impact on both countries and the region. 

The Ottoman Empire was one of the most impressive empires in human history. At its apex it expanded as far north as Vienna, Austria, as far east as the Persian Gulf, as far west as Algeria, and as far south as Yemen. At the beginning of the First World War the Ottoman Empire was greatly diminished. With the exception of the victory in Gallipoli, the Ottoman Empire had been unable to control the Arab rebellions in what is now the Gulf kingdoms and various other insurgencies in Palestine.  During World War I the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central Powers and by the end of the war had only managed to hold on to territory that is now the country of Turkey. In 1916 the British and French through the Sykes-Picot agreement divided up the Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. The British would get what is known today as Iraq and the French would get what is today known as Lebanon and Syria. The primary purpose of the agreement was to divide the remaining areas of the Ottoman Empire that were not predominantly Turkish. Following World War I, representatives of the collapsed Ottoman government signed the Treaty of Sevres, in which Turkey itself was to be divided up between the French, British, Greek, Italians and Armenians. Enraged by this, Mustafa Kemal a Turkish war hero “Launched the Turkish nationalist movement with remnants of the Ottoman army, regrouped and willing to fight what became known as the Turkish War of Independence, from 1919 to 1922”. This may have seemed futile but with military arms support from the anti-imperialist Bolshevik Russians, the Turkish nationalists pulverized their enemies. The result of the Turkish War of Independence was removal of Greeks from the western part of the country, the Italians and French from Southern Turkey, the British from the North West and pushing the Armenians out of the North East. The war ended with the Armistice of Mudanya in October of 1922 creating the Republic of Turkey as we know it today. Territorial integrity became an important component of national identity in modern Turkey and would determine Turkish foreign and domestic policy for the next 100 years, from Mustafa Kemal to Erdogan. This has special implications for the Kurdish people who were both a domestic and foreign issue for Turkey.

During and after World War I the relationship between the Turks and Kurds was a tumultuous one. During World War I various Kurdish tribes with different loyalties fought both for and against the Ottoman Empire, but the collapse of the Ottoman Empire came at a heavy price for the Kurdish people.  Lt. Col. Izzettin chief of staff of Mustafa Kemal summarized the situation of the Kurds as follows: “In the villages, there are many men capable of bearing arms', he noted on 2 May 1916. 'The enemy is pressing hard against their land. Yet most of them are not rushing to defend it. They will have nothing to do with military service. They do not know Turkish. They do not understand what government means. In brief, these are places which have not yet been conquered. Yet one could make good use of these people. They obey their tribal leaders and sheykhs, who are very influential in these parts”. The Kurdish people suffered both at the hands of their enemies and their allies. The Kurds who fought with the Ottomans suffered at the hands of the Armenians who were fighting against the Ottomans. They also suffered at the hands of the Ottomans who were displeased with Kurdish tribes unwillingness to evict Armenians from Eastern Turkey. The British who had incited some Kurdish tribes to fight against the Ottomans subsequently betrayed these same tribes when it became apparent that they would not benefit from an alliance with them. World War I was a terrible war for all involved, especially for the Kurds who were just pawns, easily replaced and discarded when no longer needed. This mistreatment would cause a wave of Kurdish nationalism and form the basis of a Kurdish national identity. “Kurdish nationalism emerged as a response to the collapsing Ottoman Empire during and after World War I. Therefore, it was not a cause but, on the contrary, the result of the empire's disintegration. The political and military activities of Kurdish notables in the pre-World War I period were not nationalistic; they reflected the desire of powerful Kurdish lineages to consolidate, expand, or recover their regional influence”. This new Kurdish nationalism clashed head on with the ultra-Turkish nationalism and laid the groundwork for what is today Turkey’s "modern Kurdish problem". When two groups claim ownership of land and both are willing to fight for it to the bitter end because it is a part of their own self-created national identity, neither will let any power foreign or domestic, interfere.  Such a conflict is definitely not unique to Turkey. Similar conflicts have played out between Western Sahara and Morocco and India and Pakistan. The main question is who’s more determined to win? 

The Kurdish people are a multi religious non-Arab, Turkish, and Persian ethnic group who live primarily in the Mountainous regions of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Approximately “25 and 35 million Kurds live in these countries”. Since the first world war they have been trying to establish their own country either by deals with the political parties of the countries they live in, foreign powers or by just full-on insurgencies.  In Syria the Kurdish people are seen as second-class citizens and have only been deemed useful when they can serve the country's interest such as when the Assad Regime used them during the Turkish Kurdish war (1980’s- present day). The Assad regime supported the PKK (The Kurdistan Workers Party), which is a Kurdish rebel group based in Turkey as a way of settling their grudges and territory disputes with Turkey. “In 1998, Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar, had granted Öcalan refuge in Damascus. The PKK chief ran military training camps in Syria and in Syrian-occupied Lebanon. From his base in Damascus, Öcalan organized the bloody guerrilla war against Turkey. In return for his protection, Öcalan made sure that the Syrian Kurds submitted to Assad's dictatorship”. In Iran the Kurdish people have few to no rights and are subjected to political and cultural discrimination. “After the Iranian Revolution, the new Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini viewed the Kurds, with their different language and traditions as outsiders, as dangerous to the new republic. Armed conflict between the new republic and the Kurds broke out as Khomeini tried to establish governmental control in the Kurdish regions” This has resulted in violence and tensions that threaten to escalate because Iran has been trying to shore up its power over Iraq including Iraqi Kurdistan. With the exception of Iraq, Turkey has had the worst relationship with the Kurdish people within its borders. The history between these groups is steeped in bloodshed and distrust.  Turkey’s relationship with its Kurds is filled with tensions which ranged from periods of strained relations to all out hostility including deportations of Kurds with the objective of Turkification to outlawing the culture of Kurdish people and suppressing their rights as even Turkish citizens. 

Due to the constant violations of Kurdish rights many rebellions ensued, none more deadly and influential than the conflicts that arose in Turkey and Iraq from the 1980’s to the early 2000’s. In Turkey, the main Kurdish guerrilla force is the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê or PKK). “The PKK was formed with Marxist-Leninist roots in 1974 and, until recently, sought to create an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey and parts of neighboring countries inhabited by Kurds”. The tactics of the PKK range from simple ambushes to kidnappings in Turkey. Its membership includes both male and female members from Kurdish neighborhoods or villages in Turkey, Syria Iran and Iraq but also is known to have recruited from Europe and other countries too.  “Members and sympathizers of the PKK continued to be involved in legal and illegal activities to raise funds in order to support the group and its affiliates. The main source of revenue appeared to be the annual fundraising campaign (kampanya) and cultural events. Legitimate businesses were also used. For example, law enforcement in Germany shut down two companies suspected of being part of PKK organizational and financial structures across Europe”. There are also accusations of drug trafficking but the PKK is only believed to tax traffickers coming through their territory. The PKK is led by “Abdullah Ocalan whose supporters call him "Apo" - the Kurdish word for "uncle"”. Apo was arrested in 1999 and is currently serving life in prison in Turkey for a litany of acts of terrorism. “The PKK is headquartered in the neighboring Kurdistan Region's Zagros Mountains, along the Turkish and Iranian borders”. It also has a strong presence in the mountainous broader region in Iraq much to the annoyance of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KRG have been in hot and cold wars with the PKK for influence in the region of Iraqi Kurdistan. In the past 6 years support of the PKK has increased due to increasingly harsh policies and violence against Kurds in Turkey. However, it is fair to point out that the PKK and other Kurdish guerrilla groups in Turkey have done their fair share of things to enrage the Turkish people and government both inside and outside Turkey. The PKK has also made inroads at establishing themselves in northeastern Syria by use of their affiliate the People’s Protection Unit (YPG), which they call Rojava.  These inroads were made due to the need to fight the so-called Islamic State also known as Daesh, who controlled most of Eastern Syria. Today the PKK is determined to fight their guerrilla campaign against anyone who they see as a threat to their dream of an Independent Kurdistan, even other Kurds, especially those who live in Iraqi Kurdistan. 

The Kurds in Iraq have been fighting for their independence for as long as the Turkish Kurds, albeit with more success. The story of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq began in 1946. After seizing power Mustafa Barzani head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) became the official leader of the Kurdish people in Iraq and Iran. Fearing Kurdish ambitions, the Iraqi government launched several attacks against Barzani and his forces who had all become known officially as the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga are the military arm of the Iraqi Kurds and the name literally means “Those who face death”. Despite Barzani and the Peshmerga being outnumbered and outgunned they managed to avoid being slaughtered by the Iraqis. In the 1970s Iraq employed violence and other tactics to get rid of the Kurds with Arabization being the preferred tactic. It is important to note that unlike the previous regimes in Iraq, the Ba’th regime under Saddam Hussein was, “a highly centralized regime, the Ba‘th government did not tolerate any form of decentralization, let alone secession, in any part of Iraq. And so, with the exception of a short period during the early 1970s, the Ba‘th government under the leadership of Saddam Hussein continued to pursue war against Kurdish insurgents”. Things came to a head when the PUK a leftist Iraqi Kurdish party and military group, was established in 1975. They instigated a civil war between themselves and the KDP in Northern Iraq and also fought the Iraqi government. Most of the fighting between the KDP and PUK stopped in 1980 when the Iran-Iraq war broke out. Taking a break from infighting, the KDP and PUK then fought as the Peshmerga, with Iran against Iraq. This alliance with Iran would lead to one of the darkest chapters in Kurdish history in response to which Saddam Hussein employed two very extreme tactics. One was Arabization which was a tactic of moving non-Kurds into Kurdish areas in an attempt to dilute Kurdish power in Northern Iraq. The other was the systematic murder or “disappearances” of Kurds either combatant or civilian. This is known today as the Anfal genocide, “Anfal was the codename used by the Iraqi government in public pronouncements and internal memoranda for a series of military campaigns mounted by Iraq’s Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party, which gradually intensified over a six-month period, against the mostly Kurdish civilian population, with the principle aim of exterminating Iraqi Kurds”. Although some dispute the number, the KRG puts the death toll at over 100,000 people killed during this six month period. The worst of these atrocities was the Halabja gas attack in 1988. “Halabja was a bustling Kurdish town with a busy commercial section and a number of government offices. Villagers displaced from their homes by the war had swollen its population of 40,000 to 60,000 or more”.  Halabja also had a significant number of Peshmerga fighters but given that it was on and near the frontlines that was not unusual. It was clear to Saddam Hussein that the Peshmerga and the Kurdish people had to be dealt with. “The regular forces of the Kurdish Democratic Party, estimated at around 15 thousand troops, continuously participate in Iranian offensives, thereby causing a lot of difficulties to the Iraqi leadership”. To solve this problem Saddam Hussein employed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid better known by his nickname Chemical Ali to formulate a “Final Solution” to this Kurdish problem. On March 16, 1988 above the town of Halabja, “up to 20 aircraft, said to include Iraqi Migs and Mirages, were seen overhead at around 1100 local time in Halabja. According to experts, the chemicals dropped by the planes may have included mustard gas, the nerve agent’s sarin, tabun and VX and possibly cyanide”. Thousands of Kurds were killed and a thousand more were wounded, mostly civilians, who thought this was a typical bombing raid and took shelter in their cellars and basements which offered no protection from the gas. A month later Saddam Hussein would do it again. In August of that year the war ended with the Kurdish people paying a heavy price for many years to come. 

After the Gas attacks, the US abandoned Saddam Hussein and applied economic sanctions on Iraq.  In 1991 Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in a desperate attempt to get sanctions removed and to recuperate the losses from the Iran-Iraq war. Unlike the gas attacks of 1988, this act of aggression was met with overwhelming military retribution for an international coalition and forced Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. In 1991 in an effort to remove Saddam Hussein the US encouraged an angry and determined Peshmerga to revolt against Saddam Hussein. The uprising was doomed from the start because of how under-equipped the Peshmerga were. In order to protect the Kurds, the US and its allies established a no-fly zone over most of Northern Iraq. “In the minds of the Kurds and their friends, the United Nations Security Council resolution 688 approved on April 5, 1991 was the cornerstone for what is now the autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq. The resolution adopted by the permanent Security Council members demanded the end of oppression against the Kurdish civilians of Iraq, and opened a humanitarian corridor to deliver vital aid to the Kurdish refugees”. The imposition of a no-fly zone over Northern Iraq provided Iraqi Kurds with international recognition, protection and an opportunity to form their own government, a first step towards achieving their dream of establishing an independent Kurdistan.  The no-fly zone also benefited Turkey in two ways. First, Kurdish refugees who had fled to Turkey during the conflict between the Peshmerga and Saddam Hussein could return home and second, it established regional stability which kept Turkey from being drawn into conflicts with their neighbors. 

With Saddam Hussein being constrained from committing crimes against the Kurdish people, the Kurds of Northern Iraq could work towards building a country and government.  “The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was formed in 1992 by the Kurdistan National Assembly, the first democratically elected parliament in Kurdistan (and in Iraq) following the no-fly zone designed to protect the Kurdistan Region from the violence of Iraq’s former Ba’ath regime (Saddam Hussein)”. The president chosen was Muhammad Fuad Masum leader of the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) with the KDP under Barzani sharing power with them. The KRG got off to a bad start due to extreme poverty, lack of medical facilities and decades of war. The only thing Iraqi Kurdistan had of value was oil which was controlled by the central government in Baghdad. To make matters worse, in order to restrict Saddam Hussein’s aggression, the international coalition imposed an oil embargo on all of Iraq, including Iraqi Kurdistan. With no other alternatives for making money to help their crippled economy, the KRG decided to strike an uneasy, backroom deal with Saddam Hussein to smuggle oil out of their territory to Turkey to sell on the open market. The deal helped Saddam Hussein get around the oil embargo and in return provided a source of income for Iraqi Kurdistan and kept Saddam Hussein from attacking the Kurds. This critical lifeline to Turkey, although a life saver for the KRG, was seen as an unforgivable act of betrayal by one particular group of Kurds in Turkey, the PKK. 

Although the PKK and KRG share a common Kurdish identity, ethnicity, culture and dreams of independence, they are arch enemies for a number of reasons. The first reason was economic. The Iraqi Kurds were selling oil to Turkey, a bitter enemy of the PKK. In response, the PKK attacked the trucks smuggling oil across the border thus hurting the main lifeline for Iraqi Kurdistan. “While under economic blockade from Saddam Hussein Turkey remains Iraqi Kurdistan’s only link with the world for aid and trade. They say they can’t risk that link and the PKK must go”! The second reason had to do with the PKK involving Iraqi Kurdistan in their war with Turkey. The PKK tried to set up a command center in Iraqi Kurdistan thinking that being outside of Turkey would protect them. Turkey then enlisted the help of the KRG and Peshmerga who fought the PKK to keep them from establishing a stronghold in Iraqi Kurdistan. A third reason was a very personal one that was more important to Iraqi Kurdistan than economics. During the Iran-Iraq war the PKK were seemingly just fighting Turkey but while the Iraqi Kurds were being gassed, bombed and shot at by Saddam Hussein, the PKK were making secret deals with Saddam Hussein in hopes of bettering their cause at the expense of the Iraqi Kurds. During the 1991 uprising between a united Iraqi Kurdistan and the Iraqi government, the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) came across some documents seized from the Iraqi Army. “These documents gave substantial weight to what the Iraqi Kurdish parties had suspected of the PKK for several years: that the PKK, in exchange for equipment, weaponry and the Iraqi army turning a blind eye to their activities, provided the very regime that was and had been committing acts of genocide and other crimes against humanity against the Iraqi Kurds with intelligence on them, indeed, even offered to fight them for Baghdad”. As a consequence, the KRG has little tolerance for the PKK’s existence and has maintained a strong anti-PKK stance. To make matters worse the KRG was also involved in another civil war between 1994 and 1998. This conflict was between the two ruling parties in Iraqi Kurdistan  (the KDP and PUK) who were fighting one another over political power, but unlike the previous civil war this one ended peacefully. In an agreement drafted by the United States it was, “agreed to a specific timetable to reconcile their decades-old differences with the goal of power sharing, revenue sharing, and elections next summer (summer of 1999)”. The peace between the KDP and PUK still holds to this day. Despite this history of conflict, the KRG remained strong and united but they soon faced their biggest challenge yet, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 

Iraqi Kurdistan received little international attention in the years leading up to the US invasion of Iraq, but this relative quiet was shattered by the sounds of US missiles that broke through it in 2003. Although the US led invasion of Iraq would have significant benefits for Iraqi Kurds and the KRG, it would also open them up to two of their biggest challenges: creating a new and prosperous government and keeping their new and old enemies from invading them. When the US invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003 the Iraqi Kurdistan was relatively untouched by the war. The removal of Saddam Hussein meant that the Kurdish people had gotten rid of their greatest enemy. In the aftermath of the invasion, the KRG was included in the new Iraqi government and the Kurdish Autonomous Region was established. In an operation dubbed “Operation Viking Hammer” Kurdish Peshmerga and US special forces carried out attacks against jihadist Kurds and Iraqis who were trying to set up bases in the southernmost part of Iraqi Kurdistan. The operation was a success and helped secure northern Iraq for most of the war. 

While the KRG was enjoying peace, freedom, autonomy, and wealth, the Kurds in Turkey continued to experience political and cultural discrimination at the hands of the Turkish government. In 2003 while, “working toward EU membership, Turkey introduced legislative and constitutional reforms that expanded Kurdish political and cultural rights, such as permitting the use of the Kurdish language in national television broadcasts”. In 2009 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) government announced a “Kurdish Initiative” which sought to end hostilities between the PKK and the Turkish Government. Unfortunately, Erdogan’s increasingly authoritarian leanings after the 2016 attempted Coup and the PKK’s unwillingness to stop their military operations in both Turkey and in Syria (with their Syrian Kurdish counterparts the People’s Protection Unit (YPG)) the ceasefire and any hopes of peace between the two slowly faded away. Erdogan has continued to crack down on protesters and political opponents, especially the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), the main opposition party to Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). The HDP is well supported by Turkish Kurds. This further soured relations between the Turkish government and the Turkish Kurds while the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan were enjoying an economic boom thanks mostly to Turkey’s and Erdogan’s policy towards them and their oil. 

Turkey and the KRG have established a fairly good relationship based largely on economic and military cooperation as well as a shared enemy, the PKK.  Turkey helps develop Iraqi Kurdistan’s petroleum reserves and buys its oil for domestic use and for export. The oil revenues in turn allow Iraqi Kurdistan to purchase military equipment from Turkey and advance military cooperation between the two governments.  Though in the past the KRG and Turkey were not allies, that all changed when “in 2009 Turkey started developing close economic and political ties with the KRG, and the two are collaborating on a gamut of issues, including efforts to pacify the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).  At the heart of these changes lay a confluence of developments. They include the new geopolitics of the region, the new foreign policy conception of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey’s domestic institutional context, changing perceptions within Turkey of the domestic Kurdish question, and efforts by key individual actors within Turkey”. 

In 2009 US president Obama announced a complete pull out of US troops from Iraq. This withdrawal was problematic for Kurds and Iraqis alike due to potential instability, but it would give Turkey a chance to enhance its regional influence. Although Turkey is not considered a global superpower, it has aspirations to become a regional superpower.  Cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan has enabled Turkey to grow their sphere of influence and make Turkey a major power player in conflicts throughout the region including Syria, Iran, Somalia, Libya and Azerbaijan. It is important to note that the AKP is a very fiercely nationalistic party who saw the Kurdish question in Iraq as an extension of their own Kurdish question which had to be answered with bullets, Turkification and other acts to subdue the Kurds. As noted, Turkey, like many other actors in the region, has a foreign policy that is ambitious and designed to help them gain leverage. A key part of gaining leverage is taking advantage of internal problems in other countries. Turkey’s first major act of regional leverage was helping answer the Kurdish question on the Iraqi side of Turkey’s border. 

Turkey has been buying oil from the Iraqi Kurds since the 1980’s however from 2013 to 2017 the pace of oil exports to Turkey increased dramatically. Trucks carrying oil from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey ran around the clock pumping life into Iraqi Kurdistan and the KRG’s pockets. This in turn allowed the KRG to build schools, hospitals and feed its people. The Iraq‐Turkey gas pipeline when completed states that, “Turkey will be able to purchase up to 20 billion cubic meters per year of Kurdish gas through a new pipeline to be built via Turkey. The imports are expected to start by early 2017”. Petroleum is the life blood of most of the world’s economy and for many countries it’s the most consistent source of income.  Turkey has further enhanced the KRG's financial and political standing and, “Turkey has forged close political and commercial ties with the KRG and dropped its fierce opposition to the Kurds’ territorial expansion and growing control over northern Iraq’s energy resources. Perhaps related to this change in attitude, Erbil has welcomed investments by Turkish companies in the Kurdistan Region, and Turkish firms were among the first to obtain production-sharing concessions to explore for oil in the KRG following the adoption of the Kurdistan Region’s oil law in 2007.” Although Turkey does not support the formation of an independent Kurdistan the KRG’s actions are tolerated by Turkey as long as the oil continues to flow. Turkey has worked hard in the last 20 years to be less dependent on oil and natural gas imports from other countries who could become enemies in the future. The KRG oil deal allows Turkey to export their own oil as well as keep their own energy bills down. The oil revenues have also encouraged investment in Iraqi Kurdistan and promoted security which has helped increase confidence of investors from around the world. “Over the past 12 years (2006-2018), local and foreign investors have contributed more than $44.4 billion in different sectors of the Kurdistan Region, according to data Kurdistan obtained from the Investment Board”. It is important to note that this investment continued even after the KRG lost Kirkuk and its vast oil fields to Iranian backed Shia militias in 2017. 

Military incursions by Iran and the PKK into Iraqi Kurdistan have become a major problem for the KRG. From 2014 to 2017 the biggest problem facing the region was the terror group known as the Islamic State or Daesh. The PKK used the fight against Daesh to establish a stronger foothold in Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan, mainly the north broader areas, the city of Sinjar and the surrounding mountainous region. Although most of the Kurdish Peshmerga are armed and trained by the US, Turkey trained some of the Peshmerga’s special forces and has armed and trained KRG militias that hold anti PKK sentiments. For example “Turkey also provided support to the Peshmerga in various Military operations such as “Operation Hammer”. Which happened from May 12 – July 7, 1997. Turkey sent 30,000 soldiers to northern Iraq to fight PKK units and to support Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party”. It has long been believed that the KRG and Turkish Government work closely but without any formal military agreements. “Hisyar Ozsoy, a lawmaker for the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, the third-largest group in the Turkish Parliament, reckons that the KRG is likely providing intelligence and logistic support to the ongoing offensive”. Although economic and military cooperation between Turkey and the KRG is strong, there is one area in which Turkey will always be on the opposite side of the KRG and the Kurds and that is the issue of Independence. 

Most Kurds dream of having their own independent country but no country has wanted to give it to them. So instead, the Kurds have resorted to war and trying to craft alliances to achieve a measure of independence with varying degrees of success. The best example of an independent Kurdistan is in Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan has international recognition, strong security, shopping malls, hospitals, fewer car bombings than anywhere else in Iraq, and a fully functioning military and government. The one thing they don’t have is full independence. Given the historical tensions between Kurds and their host countries like Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran it is unlikely that these countries will ever give the Kurds their own country. Following its victories against Islamic State (Daesh), Iraqi Kurdistan decided to have a referendum on Independence. It was overwhelmingly supported by the Iraqi Kurds, but sent shock waves throughout the world, none stronger than in Ankara, Turkey. It is clear that the issue of Kurdish independence is a red line for Turkey.  "We will not allow a fait accompli," he said of the Kurdish referendum. "We can arrive unannounced any night." Erdogan has made many threats against the KRG but it still keeps the oil flowing. It backs the KRG against Iran and the PKK but will crush any attempts at breaking fully from Baghdad. Turkey’s main concern is that Kurdish independence in Iraq might encourage Turkish, Iranian and Syrian Kurds to rise up and create their own country. Turkey considers Kurdish nationalism within its borders to be an existential threat to Turkish nationalism and identity that Mustafa Kamal (Ataturk) and his people worked and fought so hard to establish in the aftermath of a horrible war that saw the Turkish Ottoman Empire destroyed. This identity was created in the throes of war and has been engrained inside of Turkey for decades especially in the minds of Turkish nationalists who make up the party (AKP) to which Erdogan belongs. 

The purpose of this paper was to examine the complex relationship between Turkey and the Kurds in Iraq and to understand Turkey’s reasons for supporting the Iraqi Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) economically and militarily but not their goals for independence.  The reasons appear simple. Turkey benefits greatly from commercial ties with Iraqi Kurdistan, based on sales of oil and military hardware and exchange of goods and services. It also benefits from the shared hostility with Iraqi Kurdistan towards the PKK. Military cooperation between Turkey and the KRG allows Turkey to expand it’s regional influence and also keeps the PKK in check. While the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan is undoubtedly a step towards independence Turkey is threatened by the potential effect this could have on the 15 million Kurds that live within its borders. It will not tolerate the formation of a similar Turkish Kurdistan.  Nevertheless, it tolerates a semi-autonomous Kurdish state in Iraq because it serves Turkey’s interests.


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